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Aboriginal Over-representation and
R. v. Gladue: Where We Were,
Where We Are and
Where We Might Be Going
Jonathan Rudin*

I. INTRODUCTION
Clearly the most significant development in the criminal law for
Aboriginal people over the last 25 years was the decision by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Gladue.1 As significant and important as
the Gladue decision was, eight years later, rates of Aboriginal overrepresentation in the Canadian prison system continue to rise.
This paper will sketch out the background and history behind the
Gladue decision, the impact or lack of impact of the decision on
Aboriginal rates of over-representation and the role that the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 notably section 15, has played and
might play in this issue over the coming years.

II. THE PRE-GLADUE ENVIRONMENT
Aboriginal over-representation is a phenomenon of post-war Canada.
Prior to the end of the Second World War, Aboriginal people were not
over-represented in prison, but the numbers of Aboriginal people in
Canadian jails began to increase after the war.3 Over-representation was
a notorious fact in Aboriginal communities by the 1970s. After all, it is
*
Program Director at Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto and member of the faculty of
the Law and Society Program in the Division of Social Science at York University.
1
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter “the Charter”].
3
A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba,
Vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991), at 101
[hereinafter “Aboriginal Justice Inquiry”].
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not hard to notice that your friends and relatives are going to jail in
disproportionate numbers. In the broader, non-Aboriginal community,
Aboriginal over-representation only came to the fore in the late 1980s.
In 1988, the Canadian Bar Association (“CBA”) Committee on
Imprisonment and Release issued Locking Up Natives in Canada, a paper
by Professor Michael Jackson of the University of British Columbia.4
The report was adopted by the CBA at its annual meeting in 1989.5 The
report detailed levels of Aboriginal over-representation throughout Canada,
with a particular emphasis on the western provinces. The report showed
that approximately 10 per cent of federal male inmates and 13 per cent
of federal female inmates were Aboriginal.6 The numbers were even
greater in many provincial jail populations, particularly in the Western
provinces.7 Even more worrying was the fact that rates of overrepresentation were increasing over time.
The impact of Locking Up Natives8 was felt in provincial inquiries
into issues relating to Aboriginal people and the justice system. In 1991
Manitoba released its two-volume Aboriginal Justice Inquiry report9 and
in that same year Alberta released Justice on Trial — Report on the Task
Force on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and
Metis People of Alberta.10 Both these reports highlighted the issue of
Aboriginal over-representation and raised concerns about the need to
address the trend of ever-increasing rates of over-representation.
Over the same time period, non-Aboriginal Canadians became more
aware of Aboriginal issues through both the Oka crisis 11 and Elijah

4

M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 215
[hereinafter “Locking Up Natives”].
5
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 29.
6
M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23, at 220.
7
M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23, at 220.
8
M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23.
9
A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba,
Vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg, Queen’s Printer, 1991).
10
(Edmonton: Solicitor General, 1991).
11
For 78 days in the summer of 1990, the Mohawks of Kanesatake occupied land in the
town of Oka, Quebec that they maintained was their traditional territory. Eventually the Canadian
Army was called in, in an attempt to resolve the conflict. A good summary of the events can be
found in G. York & L. Pindera, People of the Pines (Toronto: Little Brown, 1991).
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Harper’s stand against the Meech Lake Accord.12 In the early 1990s, the
federal government created the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(“RCAP”), whose report on criminal justice — Bridging the Cultural
Divide — was released in 1996.13 In that report, the Commission found
Aboriginal over-representation to be “injustice personified”. The first
major finding of the report was that:
The Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples
of Canada — First Nations, Inuit and Métis people, on-reserve and
off-reserve, urban and rural — in all territorial and governmental
jurisdictions. The principal reason for this crushing failure is the
fundamentally different world views of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
people with respect to such elemental issues as the substantive content
of justice and the process of achieving justice. 14

At the same time as the Royal Commission was releasing its report
on justice, Parliament was concluding its first major review of sentencing.
The result of this process was Bill C-41,15 a comprehensive sentencing
bill that moved the principles of sentencing out of the common law and
enshrined them in the Criminal Code.16 The Bill included section 718.2(e).
The section read:
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into
consideration the following principles:
.....
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable
in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with
particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

The section is unique among common law countries with Aboriginal
populations as it is the only statute that specifically directs judges to
12
The Meech Lake Accord was an attempt by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to amend
the Canadian Constitution. Elijah Harper was an NDP MLA in Manitoba and a former chief of the
Red Sucker Creek First Nation in northern Manitoba. The Accord required the consent of the provinces
and Harper prevented the Accord from coming to a vote in the legislature. Harper’s opposition was
grounded in the failure of the Accord to address any issues important to Aboriginal people.
13
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996) [hereinafter
“Bridging the Cultural Divide”].
14
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 309.
15
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof,
S.C. 1995, c. 22.
16
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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consider the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. In explaining why
the section was placed in the Criminal Code,17 then Justice Minister
Alan Rock said to the Commons Justice Committee:
The reason we referred there specifically to aboriginal persons is that
they are sadly over-represented in the prison population in Canada. I
think it was the Manitoba justice inquiry that found that although
Aboriginal people make up only 12% of the population of Manitoba,
they comprise over 50% of the prison inmates. Nationally aboriginal
persons represent about 2% of Canada’s population, but they represent
10.6% of persons in prison. Obviously there’s a problem here …What
we’re trying to do, particularly having regard to the initiatives in the
aboriginal communities to achieve community justice, is to encourage
the courts to look at alternatives where it’s consistent with the protection
of the public — alternatives to jail — and not simply resort to the easy
answer in every case.18

Not surprisingly, the section came in for criticism. Both the Bloc
Québécois and the Reform Party (as it then was) voiced strong opposition
to the inclusion of what to them were considerations of race into the
sentencing process.19
The amendments to the Code had been passed by the time RCAP
released Bridging the Cultural Divide. In the context of that report, the
Commission was not overly enthused about the section. It said:
This statement of purposes and principles certainly does not preclude
imposing a sentence that emphasizes restorative and healing goals, but
these are not given priority nor are they seen as anchoring the sentencing
process.20

The Commission then went on to contrast what an Aboriginal statement of
purposes and principles for criminal law would look like.

17

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence, no. 62 (November 17, 1994), at 62.
19
Hansard (September 20, 1994) 5876; Hansard (November 19, 2004) 1205.
20
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 240.
18
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III. R. V. GLADUE
The precise meaning of section 718.2(e) was not evident on the passage
of Bill C-41.21 The enactment of the section did not lead immediately to
any noticeable change in sentencing practices. Like much else in the legal
landscape, it awaited a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to map
out its contours. That moment came in R. v. Gladue,22 decided in 1999.
The Supreme Court of Canada in 1998 set the stage for R. v. Gladue23
by deciding R. v. Williams.24 Williams was a case dealing with challenging
jurors for potential bias based on the race of the accused. The Ontario
Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Parks,25 which upheld such questioning in
the context of black accused persons, had not been appealed to the Supreme
Court and so this was the Court’s first opportunity to consider the question
of challenging jurors for potential racial bias.
Mr. Williams was an Aboriginal person charged with robbery in
Victoria, British Columbia. His lawyer wished to question jurors regarding
the possibility that they might be biased against Mr. Williams because
he was an Aboriginal person. The trial judge denied the motion and the
B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the decision. Essentially, the courts found
that there was a presumption of juror impartiality that could not be
overturned on the basis of evidence of generalized antipathy to members
of certain groups.26
Given the significance of the case and concern among lawyers in
Ontario that the R. v. Parks27 decision might be in jeopardy, the case
attracted six interveners: the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario,
the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations,
the Criminal Lawyers Association (Ontario) and Aboriginal Legal Services
of Toronto (“ALST”). ALST was the only organization whose mandate
was to deal with issues relating to Aboriginal people.
The Supreme Court reversed the B.C. Court of Appeal and ordered
a new trial where the accused could question prospective jurors regarding

21
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof,
S.C. 1995, c. 22.
22
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
23
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
24
[1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.).
25
[1993] O.J. No. 2157, 15 O.R. (3d) 324 (Ont. C.A.).
26
[1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 7 (S.C.C.).
27
[1993] O.J. No. 2157, 15 O.R. (3d) 324 (Ont. C.A.).
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prejudice against Aboriginal people. For a unanimous court, McLachlin J.
(as she then was) wrote:
Although they acknowledged the existence of widespread bias
against aboriginals, both Esson C.J. and the British Columbia Court of
Appeal held that the evidence did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility
that prospective jurors would be partial. In my view, there was ample
evidence that this widespread prejudice included elements that could
have affected the impartiality of jurors. Racism against aboriginals
includes stereotypes that relate to credibility, worthiness and criminal
propensity. As the Canadian Bar Association stated in Locking up
Natives in Canada: A Report of the Committee of the Canadian Bar
Association on Imprisonment and Release (1988), at p. 5:
Put at its baldest, there is an equation of being drunk, Indian and
in prison. Like many stereotypes, this one has a dark underside. It
reflects a view of native people as uncivilized and without a
coherent social or moral order. The stereotype prevents us from
seeing native people as equals.
There is evidence that this widespread racism has translated into systemic
discrimination in the criminal justice system: see Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada, at p. 33; Royal
Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution: Findings and
Recommendations, vol. 1 (1989), at p. 162; Report on the CaribooChilcotin Justice Inquiry (1993), at p. 11. Finally, as Esson C.J. noted,
tensions between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals have increased in
recent years as a result of developments in such areas as land claims
and fishing rights. These tensions increase the potential of racist jurors
siding with the Crown as the perceived representative of the majority’s
interests.28

Having dipped their toes in the issue of the treatment of Aboriginal
people by the justice system, the Court jumped in with both feet in 1999
with their decision in R. v. Gladue.29 Gladue concerned itself squarely
with the interpretation of section 718.2(e). Perhaps because of the perceived
lack of universality of the issue, the case attracted only three interveners
— the Attorneys General of Canada and Alberta, and Aboriginal Legal
Services of Toronto.

28
29

[1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 58 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
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Jamie Gladue pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the death of her
common law husband, Reuben Beaver, in Nanaimo, British Columbia.
At her sentencing, defence counsel asked that the judge apply section
718.2(e).
The trial judge noted that both the appellant and the deceased were
aboriginal, but stated that they were living in an urban area off-reserve
and not “within the aboriginal community as such”. He found that there
were not any special circumstances arising from their aboriginal status
that he should take into consideration. He stated that the offence was a
very serious one, for which the appropriate sentence was three years’
imprisonment with a ten-year weapons prohibition. 30

R. v. Gladue31 was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court
written by Cory and Iacobucci JJ. The decision provides an examination
of the purpose behind section 718.2(e), including a critique of Canada’s
overuse of incarceration generally. While section 718.2(e) is often referred
to as “the Aboriginal sentencing section”, the direction to judges regarding
Aboriginal people is found only at the end of the section. The section
clearly has applicability to all offenders and, as this paper points out, it is
largely non-Aboriginal people who have benefited from these amendments.
R. v. Gladue32 is remarkable for the direct language the Court uses in
addressing the issue of Aboriginal over-representation. Referring to the
major works on the issue of over-representation (Locking Up Natives,33
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry34 and Bridging the Cultural Divide),35 the
Court found that:
These findings cry out for recognition of the magnitude and
gravity of the problem, and for responses to alleviate it. The figures
are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian
criminal justice system. The drastic overrepresentation of aboriginal
peoples within both the Canadian prison population and the criminal
justice system reveals a sad and pressing social problem. It is reasonable
to assume that Parliament, in singling out aboriginal offenders for distinct
30

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 18 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
32
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
33
M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada, Report of the Canadian Bar Association
Committee on Imprisonment and Release (1988); reprinted in (1988-89) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23.
34
A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba,
Vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg, Queen’s Printer, 1991).
35
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996).
31
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sentencing treatment in section 718.2(e), intended to attempt to redress
this social problem to some degree. The provision may properly be
seen as Parliament’s direction to members of the judiciary to inquire
into the causes of the problem and to endeavour to remedy it, to the
extent that a remedy is possible through the sentencing process.
It is clear that sentencing innovation by itself cannot remove the
causes of aboriginal offending and the greater problem of aboriginal
alienation from the criminal justice system. The unbalanced ratio of
imprisonment for aboriginal offenders flows from a number of sources,
including poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, and the lack of
employment opportunities for aboriginal people. It arises also from
bias against aboriginal people and from an unfortunate institutional
approach that is more inclined to refuse bail and to impose more and
longer prison terms for aboriginal offenders. There are many aspects
of this sad situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons. What
can and must be addressed, though, is the limited role that sentencing
judges will play in remedying injustice against aboriginal peoples in
Canada. Sentencing judges are among those decision-makers who have
the power to influence the treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice
system. They determine most directly whether an aboriginal offender
will go to jail, or whether other sentencing options may be employed
which will play perhaps a stronger role in restoring a sense of balance
to the offender, victim, and community, and in preventing future crime.36

The Court also quoted the first major finding from Bridging the Cultural
Divide on the failure of the criminal justice system in relation to Aboriginal
people and called it a “striking yet representative statement”.37
R. v. Gladue38 offers as clear and direct a statement of the problem
of Aboriginal over-representation as could ever be expected from an
institution such as the Supreme Court of Canada. The frankness that the
Court showed in discussing the problem made the decision headline
news across the country.39
As a statement of the problem, R. v. Gladue40 bears repeated reading
and stands as a condemnation of the way in which Aboriginal people
36

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at paras. 64-65 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 62 (S.C.C.). Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People and Criminal
Justice in Canada (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 309.
38
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
39
For example, the headline in the Saturday April 24, 1999, Globe and Mail was “Top
court appalled as Natives fill Canada’s jails.”
40
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
37
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have been treated by the criminal justice system. It is significant that the
Court found over-representation to be “a crisis in the Canadian criminal
justice system”. 41 The court recognized that the issue was not that
Aboriginal people were necessarily committing more crime than
non-Aboriginal people, but rather that Aboriginal people went to jail for
their actions much more frequently than non-Aboriginal people.
The very real concern that the Court expressed about Aboriginal
over-representation is likely one of the reasons that in 2001 the Speech
from the Throne stated:
It is a tragic reality that too many Aboriginal people are finding
themselves in conflict with the law. Canada must take the measures
needed to significantly reduce the percentage of Aboriginal people
entering the criminal justice system, so that within a generation it is no
higher than the Canadian average.42

Unfortunately, six years on from the Throne Speech, this target is moving
further and further out of reach.
R. v. Gladue43 does not just describe the problem of Aboriginal
over-representation; the decision was also concerned with setting out a
way for judges to address the sentencing of Aboriginal people on a daily
basis. While the Court set out guidelines for judges, they have proven
not to be as clear as the Court’s statement of the problem.
The Court instructed judges to look at two sets of factors when
sentencing an Aboriginal offender:
(A) The unique systemic or background factors which may have played
a part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts;
and
(B) The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be
appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or
her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.44

In terms of systemic factors, the Court said that judges should take judicial
notice of the broad systemic factors that have affected Aboriginal people.
This presumably extends to the impact of colonialist government policies
41

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 64 (S.C.C.).
Speech from the Throne to Open the 37th Parliament of Canada, December 2001.
Volume 139, Issue 76, 1st Session, 37th Parliament, Edited Hansard, No. 2, at para. 1530, available
online: Senate <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/002_2001 -01-30/
HAN002-E.htm#LINKT2>.
43
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
44
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 66 (S.C.C.).
42
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such as residential schools and the mass adoption of Aboriginal children
in what has been referred to as “the 60s scoop”.
The Court was also clear that section 718.2(e) applied to all Aboriginal
people, wherever they lived, whether they might be seen as assimilated
or not.45 Courts were required to consider the section for every Aboriginal
person unless the offender expressly waived consideration of R. v. Gladue.46
The fact that Aboriginal-specific alternatives might not always be available
for an Aboriginal offender was also found not to be a bar in looking at
sentencing options. 47 As well, even if incarceration was inevitable,
judges had to look at the length of the period of incarceration for an
Aboriginal offender. In part this was because of the fact that racism
towards Aboriginal offenders was “rampant in penal institutions”.48
The problem with this proposed methodology is that it is not clear
how the necessary information will come before the court. With regard
to this issue the Court said:
… it will be extremely helpful to the sentencing judge for counsel on
both sides to adduce relevant evidence. Indeed, it is to be expected that
counsel will fulfil their role and assist the sentencing judge in this way.49

Where the accused was unrepresented the Court indicated that it was
still “incumbent upon the sentencing judge to attempt to acquire
information regarding the circumstances of the offender as an aboriginal
person”.50
What judges were to do if counsel were not being particularly helpful,
or if there were no defence counsel present, was not really addressed in
the decision. The Court appeared to assume that changes to the way that
Aboriginal people were sentenced in Canada would occur just because
the Court said that they should. Sadly, this assumption has not turned
out to be correct. Why this particular dictate of the Court has not been
followed while other decisions have received more prompt attention will
be discussed later.
The Court wanted to make clear that while section 718.2(e) mandated a
different way in which an Aboriginal person was to be sentenced, it did
not mean that on all occasions an Aboriginal person would receive a
45
46
47
48
49
50

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 91 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 83 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 92 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 68 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 83 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 84 (S.C.C.).
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different sentence than a non-Aboriginal person in similar circumstances.
The Court’s reasoning in this area has led to a great deal of confusion.
The Court stated:
Yet, even where an offence is considered serious, the length of the
term of imprisonment must be considered. In some circumstances the
length of the sentence of an aboriginal offender may be less and in
others the same as that of any other offender. Generally, the more violent
and serious the offence the more likely it is as a practical reality that
the terms of imprisonment for aboriginals and non-aboriginals will be
close to each other or the same, even taking into account their different
concepts of sentencing.51

For some, the last sentence of the paragraph is the determinative one.
On this reading, while the methodology for determining a fit sentence
for an Aboriginal offender might be different than if the offender were a
non-Aboriginal person, once violence is involved, the result will be the
same. This interpretation reduces R. v. Gladue52 to standing for the
proposition that in cases of violence Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
offenders will receive the same sentence. This seems to be an odd
message to take from a decision that spends most of its time talking
about the problem of over-representation. It also ignores the fact that
Jamie Gladue pleaded guilty to manslaughter — clearly a violent offence.
Nevertheless, as reductive as this viewpoint might seem, it was picked
up very quickly, particularly by Crowns and judges who might not agree
with the other aspects of the Court’s decision.

IV. THE IMPACT OF GLADUE ON THE COURTS
The waters were further muddied a year later in 2000, when the
Supreme Court issued its decision in R. v. Wells.53 Wells was one of a
series of cases that came to the Court regarding the interpretation of the
conditional sentencing provisions of Bill C-41.54 Mr. Wells was an
Aboriginal person convicted of a sexual assault at the Tsuu T’inaa First
Nation outside of Calgary, Alberta. He was sentenced to 20 months’
imprisonment. The matter went to the Alberta Court of Appeal, which
51

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 79 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
53
[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.).
54
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof,
S.C. 1995, c. 22.
52
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considered section 781.2(e) and fresh evidence provided by the appellant
but nevertheless upheld the sentence. This appeal was heard before the
R. v. Gladue55 decision and so the Supreme Court reviewed the fitness of
the sentence in the context of that decision. At this hearing before the
Supreme Court there was only one intervener, Aboriginal Legal Services
of Toronto.
In another unanimous decision, this time by Iacobucci J. alone, the
Court once again emphasized that R. v. Gladue56 mandated a different
methodology, not necessarily a different result. The Court went on to say:
The generalization drawn in Gladue to the effect that the more
violent and serious the offence, the more likely as a practical matter
for similar terms of imprisonment to be imposed on aboriginal and
non-aboriginal offenders, was not meant to be a principle of universal
application. In each case, the sentencing judge must look to the
circumstances of the aboriginal offender. In some cases, it may be that
these circumstances include evidence of the community’s decision to
address criminal activity associated with social problems, such as
sexual assault, in a manner that emphasizes the goal of restorative
justice, notwithstanding the serious nature of the offences in question.57

At the same time, the Court upheld the sentence of imprisonment even
though the fresh evidence provided to the Court of Appeal provided
treatment options in a non-incarceral setting.58 As with Gladue, the case
could be seen to stand for the proposition that sentence parity with nonAboriginal offenders is the norm for violent offences or for the proposition
that this is expressly not the case.
After dealing with Aboriginal-specific criminal cases for three years
in a row (R. v. Williams,59 R. v. Gladue60 and R. v. Wells61), the Court has
not revisited this area since 2000. In the interim, conflicting lower court
decisions dealing with Aboriginal people convicted of violent offences
have fallen into two camps.
One set of decisions focus on the portions of R. v. Gladue62 and R. v.
Wells63 that stress that serious and violent offences are still subject to
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, at para. 50 (S.C.C.).
[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, at para. 48 (S.C.C.).
[1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
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restorative sentences and that sentence length must be considered in all
cases. Not surprisingly, this line of cases generally approves of conditional
sentences or sentences with a shorter period of imprisonment than sought
by the Crown.64
The other set of decisions refers only to the sentence in R. v. Gladue
that argues for sentence parity with non-Aboriginal offenders65 and the
restatement of this notion in R. v. Wells.66 Once again it is not surprising
to find that the resulting sentences pursuant to this manner of interpretation
are incarceral sentences, rather than conditional sentences, and are
consistent with the Crown’s position on the length of the sentence.67
R. v. Gladue68 dealt with the interpretation of a section of the
Criminal Code69 that was expressly concerned with sentencing. One of
the live questions arising from the decision was the extent to which the
decision could be extended to other areas involving the treatment of
Aboriginal offenders by the justice system.
The first area where this issue arose was in bail decisions. Justice
Brent Knazan of the Ontario Court of Justice addressed this matter in a
paper he presented to the National Judicial Institute in 2003.70 He noted
the systemic barriers faced by Aboriginal accused persons, including, as
the Supreme Court of Canada noted in R. v. Gladue,71 a greater reluctance
to give bail to Aboriginal accused persons. The consequence of this
practice is that without reliance on Gladue principles, many Aboriginal
offenders will have effectively served their sentences by the time their
plea is entered. The reason for this, of course, is that the amount of dead
time they will have accrued will be equal to, or in excess of, what they
63

[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.).
R. v. R. (M.S.), [2002] B.C.J. No. 845 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Dennis, [2001] B.C.J. No. 122
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Peters, [2000] B.C.J. No. 959 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Sackanay, [2000] O.J. No. 885
(Ont. C.A.); R. v. A. (J.E.), [1999] B.C.J. No. 1661 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Logan, [1999] O.J. No. 3411
(Ont. C.A.).
65
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 79 (S.C.C.).
66
[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.).
67
R. v. W. (L.D.), [2005] B.C.J. No. 1746 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. M. (K.E.), [2004] B.C.J. No. 2735
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Morris, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1117 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. J. (R.), [2004] B.C.J. No. 125
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Froman, [2003] O.J. No. 4222 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. K. (D.T.), [2002] B.C.J. No. 586
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Gates, [2002] B.C.J. No. 416 (B.C.C.A.).
68
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
69
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
70
B. Knazan, “Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders in a Large City — The Toronto Gladue
(Aboriginal Persons) Court”, National Judicial Institute, Aboriginal Law Seminar, January 23-25, 2003,
Calgary, available online <http://aboriginallegal.ca/docs/knazan.pdf>.
71
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
64

700

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

might have received had they pleaded guilty at their first opportunity.
The imposition of a “time-served” sentence precludes any meaningful
consideration of the Gladue principles on sentencing. As a result, Justice
Knazan concluded that the Gladue principles applied on bail hearings.72
This viewpoint was adopted by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in
R. v. Bain.73
The decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Sim74 extended
the reach of R. v. Gladue75 still further. R. v. Sim was an appeal of a
decision by the Ontario Review Board regarding an application for release
by an Aboriginal person who was found not criminally responsible and
confined to a secure psychiatric facility. Justice Sharpe, for the Court,
quoted extensively from R. v. Williams76 and R. v. Gladue and concluded:
I do not think that the principles underlying Gladue should be limited
to the sentencing process and I can see no reason to disregard the
Gladue principles when assessing the criminal justice system’s treatment
of NCR accused.77

The National Parole Board has adopted a similar view and now requires
that Gladue principles be considered when Aboriginal offenders have their
parole hearings.
The result of decisions such as these has been to expand the reach of
R. v. Gladue78 to virtually every occasion in which the liberty of an
Aboriginal person is at risk. The implications of this expansion of the
principles will be discussed later.

V. ABORIGINAL OVER-REPRESENTATION SINCE GLADUE
Although R. v. Gladue79 clearly set out a direction for judges and
expressly gave them the mandate to address the issue of Aboriginal
over-representation as best they could through the sentencing process,

72
B. Knazan, “Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders in a Large City — The Toronto Gladue
(Aboriginal Persons) Court”, National Judicial Institute, Aboriginal Law Seminar, January 23-25,
2003, Calgary, available online: <http://aboriginallegal.ca/docs/knazan.pdf>, at 11-14.
73
[2004] O.J. No. 6147 (Ont. S.C.J.).
74
[2005] O.J. No. 4432, 78 O.R. (3d) 183 (Ont. C.A.).
75
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
76
[1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.).
77
[2005] O.J. No. 4432, 8 O.R. (3d) 183, at para. 16 (Ont. C.A.).
78
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
79
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
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the reality is that despite the enactment of section 718.2(e) and Gladue,
rates of Aboriginal over-representation have continued to increase.
As a contemporary statement of the problem, the Office of the
Correctional Investigator, in its 2005/2006 report, estimated that the
incarceration rate for non-Aboriginal people is 117 per 100,000 adults.
The incarceration rate for Aboriginal people is almost 10 times higher
— 1,024 per 100,000 adults.80
At the time R. v. Gladue81 was decided, Aboriginal people made up
12 per cent of all federal inmates and 19 per cent of all sentenced inmates.
By 2004/2005 Aboriginal people accounted for 17 per cent of admissions
to federal custody and 22 per cent of admissions to all provincial
correctional facilities.82 The same trend is observable for young offenders
as well, although the level of over-representation is worse for Aboriginal
young people.83 If this is progress, it is progress of the worst kind.
Julian Roberts and Ronald Melchers reviewed admissions to provincial
correctional facilities from 1978 to 2001. The study found that over that
period the number of Aboriginal people in custody increased from 14,576
to 15,349, while the number of non-Aboriginals decreased from 76,526 to
65,576.84 Interestingly, the post Bill C-4185 period, including a few years
after the R. v. Gladue86 decision, did not have any impact on Aboriginal
incarceration rates.
What is mystifying is why the number of aboriginal admissions to
custody did not decline at an accelerated rate (compared to non-aboriginal
offenders) from 1996 onwards, as a result of the sentencing reforms
introduced that year and the subsequent judgments from the Supreme
Court within the next few years. In fact, although it encompasses only
a few years (1997-1998 to 2000-2001), the post C-41 period reveals an
increase in the volume of aboriginal admissions to custody of 3%,
while non-aboriginal admissions declined by fully 27%. This is quite
80

The Correctional Investigator Canada, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional
Investigator 2005-2006 (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2006), at 11.
81
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
82
“Adult Correctional Services in Canada 2004-2005” (2006) 26 (5) Juristat, at 15-16.
83
J. Latimer & L. Foss, A One-Day Snapshot of Aboriginal Youth in Custody Across
Canada: Phase II (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2004), at ii; see also J. Rudin,
“Incarceration of Aboriginal Youth in Ontario 2004-2006 — the Crisis Continues” (2007) 53 Crim.
L.Q. 260.
84
J. Roberts & R. Melchers, “The Incarceration of Aboriginal Offenders: Trends from 1978
to 2001” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. & Crim. Just., at 211.
85
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof,
S.C. 1995, c. 22.
86
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
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the reverse of what would be expected in light of sentencing reforms
specifically addressing the plight of aboriginal offenders. After all,
both statutory reforms and appellate jurisprudence during this period
encouraged judges to consider the use of alternatives to incarceration
for all offenders but to pay particular attention to the circumstances of
aboriginal offenders.
This suggests that these developments, including a proliferation of
publications highlighting the issue, codification of a special direction
to judges (and its subsequent endorsement by the Supreme Court), and
the creation of a new alternative to imprisonment (the conditional sentence
of imprisonment) have all failed to benefit aboriginal offenders to quite
the same extent as non-aboriginal offenders. ...87

The continued rise in over-representation of Aboriginal people in
prisons is not really that mystifying. First, as was noted earlier, section
718.2(e) is not an Aboriginal sentencing provision. It is a provision of
general application that mentions consideration of Aboriginal offenders
at the end of the section. The section in no way suggests that judges
should not look for alternatives to incarceration for non-Aboriginal
people. What the statistics show is that courts find it easier to come up with
alternatives for non-Aboriginal offenders than for Aboriginal offenders.
The same situation applies with regard to young offenders. The Youth
Criminal Justice Act,88 which came into force in 2003, contains many
restraints on the use of imprisonment for young people. The Act also
includes the equivalent of section 718.2(e) (a greater discussion on this
section of the YCJA follows later). Incarceration statistics following the
implementation of the YCJA show rates of Aboriginal over-representation
increasing. In the case of young offenders, fewer Aboriginal and nonAboriginal youth are being sent to jail, but the drop in imprisonment
rates for non-Aboriginal offenders is much greater than that for Aboriginal
offenders. As a result, rates of Aboriginal over-representation continue
to rise.89
The key reason that rates of Aboriginal over-representation have not
decreased is that the process by which judges are to get information

87

J. Roberts & R. Melchers, “The Incarceration of Aboriginal Offenders: Trends from 1978
to 2001” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. & Crim. Just. 211, at 226.
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S.C. 2002, c. 1 [hereinafter “YCJA”].
89
See J. Latimer & L. Foss, A One-Day Snapshot of Aboriginal Youth in Custody Across
Canada: Phase II (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2004) and J. Rudin, “Incarceration of
Aboriginal Youth in Ontario 2004-2006 – The Crisis Continues” (2007) 53 Crim. L.Q. 260.
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about Aboriginal offenders proposed in R. v. Gladue90 does not work in
practice. As courts have repeatedly stated, Gladue is in no way a “get
out jail free card” for Aboriginal offenders.91 Aboriginal offenders do not
receive a discount in their sentence by virtue solely of being Aboriginal.
Gladue emphasizes that in order to craft a different sentence for an
Aboriginal offender, judges need information, both about the offender
and about the systemic factors that have played a role in the life of the
offender.
It is not surprising that judges are not getting this information. Defence
counsel do not have any particular knowledge or expertise on the systemic
factors that have led to Aboriginal over-representation. Nor do defence
counsel necessarily have the skills to gather information on the life
history of their client. Law schools still spend very little time teaching
about sentencing and sentencing submissions. While a vital part of the
work of defence counsel, sentencing is rarely the subject of continuing
legal education sessions. Even if counsel do possess the skills necessary
to gather the requisite information for a substantive sentencing submission,
they do not necessarily get remunerated for this work. In many legal aid
plans a guilty plea is a guilty plea — regardless of the work that is put
into the plea. While it would be nice to think that money should not be a
factor in this area, that view would reveal a striking degree of naivety.
Theoretically, issues of the kind raised in R. v. Gladue92 could be the
subject of pre-sentence reports (“p.s.r.s”). Although some provinces
indicate that they include Gladue considerations in their p.s.r.s, the
reality is that this is a very hit and miss process. In some provinces the
amount of time a probation officer can spend on a p.s.r. is prescribed
and might preclude taking the time necessary to acquire the requisite
information. As well, the scope of many p.s.r.s, particularly for adult
offenders, is simply to determine whether the offender is suitable for a
community disposition, not what that disposition might be. For the most
part, the reality is that the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders in the
post-Gladue world proceeds very much like it did pre-Gladue. When the
90

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
In R. v. Kakekagamick, [2006] O.J. No. 3346, 81 O.R. (3d) 664 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario
Court of Appeal said, at para. 34:
The [Supreme] Court affirmed that s. 718.2(e) imposes a duty on the sentencing judge
to approach the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders differently. That is, it is not a mitigating
factor on sentencing simply to be an Aboriginal offender, as the Crown erroneously asserts
in its factum. Nor is being an Aboriginal offender, as I have heard it referred to, a “get out of
jail free” card.
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[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
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prevailing ethos is “business as usual” then there is no reason to expect
that sentencing practices will change. If sentencing practices do not change,
then rates of Aboriginal over-representation will not change either; indeed,
they may worsen.
One might wonder why the direction from the Supreme Court of
Canada to change the way Aboriginal offenders are sentenced has not
met with the same response as other decisions of the Court. For example,
when the Court stated that delays in getting matters to trial meant that
charges would be thrown out of court, 93 governments responded by
building more courthouses and appointing more judges. When the Court
mandated more expansive disclosure rules,94 disclosure practices changed
quickly. Recently, the Court required a change to the laws regarding
those held on security certificates95 and an amended law was passed by
Parliament within months. Should not all directions from the Court be
addressed promptly?
The key difference between R. v. Gladue96 and the other examples
cited above is that in the latter cases, failure by the government to act
would mean that potentially guilty people might go free or be released
from custody. Inaction on these issues would lead to serious questions
from the opposition, editorials in newspapers and the fanning of fears for
public safety. On the other hand, inaction in response to Gladue means
that Aboriginal people continue to go to jail. While this development
clearly constitutes “a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system” in
the eyes of the Court, it does not carry the political baggage that being
“soft on crime” carries.

VI. GLADUE COURTS AND GLADUE REPORTS
In 2000, the Ontario Conference of Judges and the Canadian
Association of Provincial Court Judges held their annual conference in
Ottawa. One of the focuses of discussion at the conference was sentencing
Aboriginal offenders post-R. v. Gladue.97 According to Justice Knazan:

93

R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1990] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
95
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R.
350 (S.C.C.).
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[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
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There was much interest and discussion that revealed stark problems.
Four years after s. 718.2(e) was proclaimed and almost two years after
the judgement in R. v. Gladue, there was confusion about how to
consistently apply the section. The problems were fundamental; many
judges had difficulty even knowing when an Aboriginal offender was
before the court.98

At the conference, discussions began with judges from the Old City
Hall Court in Toronto, representatives from Aboriginal Legal Services of
Toronto and Professor Kent Roach (who represented ALST before the
Supreme Court in R. v. Williams,99 R. v. Gladue and R. v. Wells100) about
creating a specialized court that dealt only with Aboriginal people. In
October 2001, the Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court began hearing
cases at Old City Hall. The court now sits two days a week. Two other
Gladue Courts have been established in Toronto, one at the College
Park Court and the other at the 1000 Finch Court. All Gladue Courts
deal with bail hearings and sentencing Aboriginal offenders. The courts
do not do trials.
In order to support the Gladue Court, ALST created the position of
the Gladue Caseworker. It is the role of the Gladue Caseworker to prepare
written reports on Aboriginal offenders at the request of the judge,
defence or Crown. The reports, known as Gladue Reports, are generally
prepared only where there is a strong likelihood that an offender will
receive a period of incarceration as part of his or her sentence.
Gladue Reports go into great detail concerning the life circumstances
of the offender. All efforts are made to speak with friends, family members
and anyone who can shed light on the life of the person. The reports
extensively quote interviewees verbatim. The reports also place the
individual’s life circumstances in the context of the systemic factors that
have affected Aboriginal people. The reports also contain concrete plans
as to alternatives to incarceration. For example, if the report suggests
that the offender take a program for substance abuse, an application to
a program will often have been completed and an acceptance date
received prior to the report being filed. ALST will, if necessary, provide
the funds to allow the offender to attend the treatment centre if it is out
of town. Over the past two years, ALST has created additional positions
98
B. Knazan, “Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders in a Large City — The Toronto Gladue
(Aboriginal Persons) Court”, National Judicial Institute, Aboriginal Law Seminar, January 23-25, 2003,
Calgary, available online: <http://aboriginallegal.ca/docs/knazan.pdf>, at p. 3.
99
[1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (S.C.C.).
100
[2000] S.C.J. No. 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.).
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for Gladue Aftercare Workers, to assist clients in meeting the terms of
their sentence or bail conditions.
What this means in practice is that a judge who is in receipt of a
Gladue Report will have a greater understanding of the life of the
offender before him or her and of how systemic issues have impacted
that life, and there will also be a very detailed plan presented that will
attempt to address the factors that have led the offender into the criminal
justice system. Gladue Caseworkers prepare reports in Toronto and in
the Hamilton/Brantford area. In some cases the reports are ordered in
Gladue Courts; in many cases they are not.
Evaluations of the program have shown that Gladue Reports have an
impact on the sentences that are handed down to Aboriginal offenders.
Campbell Research Associates found that judges, Crown counsel and
defence counsel all agreed that Gladue Reports enable the courts to better
meet the requirements of the Criminal Code101 and the Youth Criminal
Justice Act102 regarding the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.103 Crown
attorneys often changed their position on sentence after receiving a
Gladue Report.104 All the judges interviewed in the evaluation agreed
that the reports formed a sound basis for a sentence.105
The experience of the Gladue Courts and Gladue Reports shows that
jail need not be the default option when sentencing Aboriginal offenders.
It also shows that there is a need to consciously address how to do things
differently if change is going to occur.

VII. R. V. KAKEKAGAMICK
The need for adequate information to allow judges to make an
informed sentencing decision was front and centre in the Ontario Court
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
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Campbell Research Associates, “Evaluation of the Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto
Gladue Caseworker Program, Year Two, October 2005-September 2006”, November 2006, available
online: <http://Aboriginaloriginallegal.ca/docs/Year_2.pdf>, at 20.
104
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Gladue Caseworker Program, Year Two, October 2005-September 2006”, November 2006,
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of Appeal decision in R. v. Kakekagamick.106 Mr. Kakekagamick, a firsttime offender in his late twenties, was convicted in Kenora, Ontario of
aggravated assault against his girlfriend. At his sentencing there were no
substantive submissions to the Court with respect to the applicant’s
Aboriginal background and no reference was made to R. v. Gladue.107
While the trial judge made reference to the fact that the offender was an
Aboriginal person, she failed to consider any of the principles raised in
the decision.108
When the matter came before the Court of Appeal, neither defence
counsel nor the Crown cited R. v. Gladue109 in their factums or raised it
in their argument. The Court of Appeal took the unusual step of ordering
another pre-sentence report — which it referred to as a Gladue Report —
and reserved judgment until the report was received.110
In a unanimous judgment by LaForme J., the Court of Appeal
concluded that the lack of any substantive consideration of R. v. Gladue111
on sentencing was an error of law. The effect of the error of law was to
require the Court to sentence the appellant anew on the basis of the fresh
evidence that the court requested.112
R. v. Kakekagamick 113 makes it clear that failure to address the
issues raised in R. v. Gladue114 when sentencing an Aboriginal offender
is an error of law that requires the offender to be resentenced by a Court
of Appeal. It is not enough for the sentencing judge to note that
the offender is Aboriginal and mention Gladue in passing to render the
sentence appeal-proof. On the contrary, where defence counsel or the
Crown fails to address the Gladue factors, the judge must take it upon
himself or herself to launch such an inquiry. Kakekagamick clearly
raises the bar in terms of the expectations placed on all parties when an
Aboriginal offender is sentenced.
R. v. Kakekagamick115 is not without its problems, however. While
the Court of Appeal was quite forthright in declaring that the sentencing
106
[2006] O.J. No. 3346, 81 O.R. (3d) 664 (Ont. C.A.). Leave to Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada was refused.
107
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
108
R. v. Kakekagamick, [2006] O.J. No. 3346, 81 O.R. (3d) 664, at para. 51 (Ont. C.A.).
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[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
110
R. v. Kakekagamick, [2006] O.J. 1449 (endorsement) para. 3 (Ont. C.A.).
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judge had erred, it nevertheless sentenced Mr. Kakekagamick to a fiveyear sentence — the same sentence as the trial judge imposed. Thus, even
though there was no real consideration of R. v. Gladue116 at the initial
sentencing and even though the pre-sentence report relied upon at that
sentencing was found of little use, the Court of Appeal essentially
upheld the sentence. The Court’s rationale for this decision was that the
offence was “serious and violent” and so there was no reason to depart
from the sentence that would have been imposed on a non-Aboriginal
offender.117 In this part of its interpretation of Gladue and R. v. Wells,118
Kakekagamick sides with the status quo.

VIII. THE CHARTER, GLADUE AND ABORIGINAL
OVER-REPRESENTATION
Where does the Charter fit into all of this? In R. v. Gladue119 there is
a very brief discussion of section 15(2). Counsel for Gladue argued that
section 718.2(e) was, in some ways, an affirmative action program and
therefore protected under s. 15(2) of the Charter. The respondent felt that
this viewpoint amounted to reverse discrimination against non-Aboriginal
offenders. The Court chose not to wade into the section15 waters.
There is no constitutional challenge to s. 718.2(e) in these proceedings,
and accordingly we do not address specifically the applicability of s. 15
of the Charter. We would note, though, that the aim of s. 718.2(e) is to
reduce the tragic overrepresentation of aboriginal people in prisons. It
seeks to ameliorate the present situation and to deal with the particular
offence and offender and community. The fact that a court is called
upon to take into consideration the unique circumstances surrounding
these different parties is not unfair to non-aboriginal people. Rather,
the fundamental purpose of s. 718.2(e) is to treat aboriginal offenders
fairly by taking into account their difference. 120

This is not to say that section 15 might not play a role in ensuring that
Gladue remains the applicable law in the sentencing of Aboriginal
offenders, at least until the promise of the 2001 Throne Speech is met.
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When the federal government drafted its new Youth Criminal
Justice Act,121 an equivalent section to 718.2(e) was absent. A number of
reasons were suggested for why such a section was missing. On the one
hand, it was suggested that the existing wording in the Act, while not
mirroring section 718.2(e), made the same point. On the other hand, the
more cynical viewpoint was that the government felt that the law was
going to be enough of a challenge to pass given concerns from the Bloc
Québécois that the law was too repressive and restricted innovations
being carried out in Quebec, and concerns from the Reform Party that
the law was too lenient on young offenders. As was noted earlier, the
one area that the Bloc Québécois and the Reform Party agreed on was
their displeasure with section 718.2(e). Keeping it out of the YCJA would
stop these two opponents of the legislation from banding together on
this issue.
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto appeared before the Senate
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs to raise its
concerns about the omission of a 718.2(e) section in the bill. As part of
its submissions ALST said that allowing adult Aboriginal offenders to
avail themselves of the provisions of section 718.2(e) but denying
Aboriginal youth that opportunity was a violation of section 15. ALST
promised to launch a Charter challenge against the Youth Criminal
Justice Act122 if it was not amended.123 ALST had secured funding from
the Court Challenges Program124 to launch such a case.
The Senate made only one amendment to the Youth Criminal Justice
125
Act before sending it back to Parliament one last time for approval.
That amendment was to put the wording of section 718.2(e) in two
sections of the YCJA. While it is impossible to determine the original
intent of the framers of these amendments, it would appear that concerns
for fairness and equality of treatment of Aboriginal youth were part of
the motivation behind the Senate’s decision. When introducing the
amended YCJA to Parliament for its final approval, then Minister of
Justice Martin Cauchon noted that the amendment essentially ensured that
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Aboriginal youth were now treated in an equal fashion to Aboriginal
adults.126
One of the ways in which the impact of sections such as section
718.2(e) can be blunted is by legislation mandating minimum sentences.
One of the purposes behind minimum sentence laws is to tie the hands
of judges and to prevent them from relying on other sentencing options
such as conditional sentences. While the Conservative Party has recently
introduced a number of bills adding minimum sentences to the Criminal
Code,127 the previous Liberal government was not shy in introducing
new mandatory minimums as well.128
The fact that mandatory minimums restrict attempts by judges to
address over-representation is a by-product of a more generalized desire
by legislators to direct judges in sentencing offenders for certain
offences. Whether an intended consequence or not, the use of mandatory
minimums cannot help but make it harder to reduce levels of Aboriginal
over-representation. This suggests that there might well be a role for
section 15 when an Aboriginal offender is being sentenced for an offence
where there is a mandatory minimum.
Although this issue has not yet come before a court of appeal, the
Ontario Court of Justice has considered it on at least two occasions. In
R. v. King,129 Knazan J. found that mandatory minimum provisions for
Aboriginal people convicted of second or subsequent impaired driving
offences violated section 15 and could not be saved by section 1. The
precise nature of the infringement in this case arose, in part, because of
the specific nature of the impaired driving provisions. Section 727 of the
Criminal Code130 gives the Crown discretion to introduce evidence of
previous impaired driving convictions. Upon proof of prior convictions
the judge is required to impose at least the mandatory minimums. The
Crown’s discretion as to whether or not to introduce prior convictions
distinguishes this mandatory minimum from others in the Criminal Code.
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Canada. House of Commons, January 30, 2002, 37th Parliament, 1st Session Edited
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In his analysis, Knazan J. noted that R. v. Gladue131 makes clear that
“the Canadian penal justice system has historically discriminated against
Aboriginal people, generally and in particular through the excessive
incarceration of aboriginal persons in a systemic manner”132 and that
section 718.2(e) was Parliament’s attempt to address this discrimination.
Because mandatory minimums preclude a sentencing judge “from
considering an aboriginal person’s particular circumstances and [mandate
a judge] to sentence an aboriginal offender to jail, a sentencing judge
may perpetuate the historical and continuing discrimination against
aboriginal people”.133
Justice Knazan concludes his section 15 analysis by saying:
The effect of the impugned legislation is to return aboriginal
offenders, and only aboriginal offenders, to a situation in which the
historical discrimination against them is an established fact. It is localized
and severe. It deprives them of the benefit of s. 718.2(e), which was
enacted to address the discriminatory treatment of aboriginals by
sentencing courts.134

The remedy was to grant Mr. King a constitutional exemption to allow
him to argue for a non-incarceral sentence in his case.
Importantly, Knazan J.’s reasoning was grounded on R. v. Gladue135
and its analysis of Aboriginal over-representation. Section 718.2(e) was
seen as the method by which over-representation could be addressed,
but it was not the motivating factor for finding discrimination in the
mandatory minimum provisions.
Another judge of the Ontario Court of Justice came to the opposite
conclusion in a similar case.136 The decision in King137 has not been
appealed by the Crown.138 It will have to wait until a later date to see
whether this decision will have more universal application. Such challenges
can be expected as legislation requiring more and more mandatory
minimums take effect.

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
R. v. King, [2007] O.J. No. 2099, at para. 38 (Ont. C.J.).
R. v. King, [2007] O.J. No. 2099, at para. 38 (Ont. C.J.).
R. v. King, [2007] O.J. No. 2099, at para. 69 (Ont. C.J.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Boissoneau, [2006] O.J. No. 5607 (Ont. C.J.).
R. v. King, [2007] O.J. No. 2099 (Ont. C.J.).
While granting the exemption, Knazan J. did sentence Mr. King to a period of incarceration.

712

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Since the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in R. v.
Gladue139 there have been concerns that the portion of section 718.2(e)
dealing with Aboriginal people might be repealed. Given the antipathy
to the section expressed by both the Conservative Party and the Bloc
Québécois, it is certainly possible to imagine a scenario in which this
takes place.
Even if this part of the section were repealed, however, that would
not necessarily negate the impact of R. v. Gladue.140 The findings of that
decision did not rest on the existence of a section of the Criminal
Code.141 That the Canadian criminal justice system has failed Aboriginal
people is a finding of the Supreme Court of Canada. That finding did
not rest on the passage of section 718.2(e). The Court made clear that
this section was Parliament’s attempt to address the issue of Aboriginal
over-representation. Repealing section 718.2(e) will not make the reality
of Aboriginal over-representation go away.
Further entrenching R. v. Gladue142 in the legal landscape are decisions
such as R. v. Bain143 and R. v. Sim.144 The reasoning behind these
decisions is that Gladue extends beyond the sentencing process. Since
section 718.2(e) does not apply to bail, review board or parole hearings,
repealing the section will not change the law in these areas mandating
consideration of the Gladue principles. In the event of repeal, it would
be open to counsel to argue that Gladue is still the definitive case on
sentencing even if section 718.2(e) no longer exists.
What is more problematic is the fact that despite R. v. Gladue,145
Aboriginal rates of over-representation continue to rise. Given the finding
that the criminal justice system has failed Aboriginal people, is there the
possibility of a section 15 challenge to the lack of action on overrepresentation? Does the fact that the only Gladue Courts in Canada are
located in Toronto give rise to a challenge from Aboriginal offenders in
other jurisdictions?
There certainly could be strong arguments marshalled in favour of a
section 15 challenge to government inaction in the face of R. v. Gladue146
139
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and rising rates of Aboriginal over-representation. A finding that the
criminal justice system has failed Aboriginal offenders is a finding that
the system does not treat Aboriginal offenders in the same way that other
offenders are treated.
The problem, of course, is that a successful challenge would require
that the courts compel governments to direct resources to address this issue.
As recent section 15 jurisprudence has shown, courts are increasingly
reluctant to embark on such a road. Making matters more difficult is that
empirical evidence does not yet exist to show precisely what governments
should do to address the problem. While the lack of definitive solutions
is not a bar to innovation, indeed it should spur on new approaches, the
fact that there are no easy-to-describe, inexpensive, off-the-shelf responses
to the problem would likely inhibit courts from moving to require
government action in this area.

IX. CONCLUSION
That the Charter will not serve as the instrument by which Aboriginal
over-representation is wrestled to the ground is not a condemnation of
the Charter or the courts. It is a recognition of reality. Section 718.2(e)
and R. v. Gladue147 provided a groundwork upon which change could
occur. While this change is not happening fast enough, if indeed it is
happening at all, it does not mean that the effort should be abandoned.
Initiatives such as Gladue Courts and Gladue Reports, the day-to-day
efforts of counsel, the work of Aboriginal organizations, the commitment
of funding and programming by governments and the continued expansion
of Gladue by the courts will all play a role.
Real societal change cannot come from courts. They can help spur
action but that is as far as they can go. In the face of indifference or
hostility, the most progressive decisions will simply be ignored. R. v.
Gladue148 has given the opportunity for more widespread recognition
and action on the problem of Aboriginal over-representation. It is up to
those who are committed to seeing such change occur to do what they
can in the areas that they occupy to see that the opportunity is not wasted.
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